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For  20  years,  scientists  have  created  a  range  of  false  autobiographical  memories  using  
the  “Lost  in  the  mall”  paradigm.  Recently  Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  suggested  to  adults  
that,  as  adolescents,  they  had  committed  a  crime  resulting  in  a  brush  with  police.  Their  
finding  that  70%  constructed  "ʺrich  false  memories”  is  markedly  outside  the  central  
tendency  of  the  literature,  so  we  considered  a  counterexplanation  for  Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  
results:  They  failed  to  distinguish  between  subjects  who  appeared  to  remember  (false  
memories)  versus  believe  the  suggestion  (false  beliefs).  We  used  three  different  
approaches  to  recode  their  data.  Using  Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  approach,  we  replicated  their  
70%.  Using  alternative  approaches  that  distinguish  between  false  beliefs  and  memories,  
we  found  26-­‐‑30%  of  subjects  met  the  criteria  for  false  memories.  Moreover,  we  showed  
that  laypeople’s  understanding  of  remembering  better  aligns  with  the  alternative  
coding  approaches  than  with  Shaw  and  Porter’s.    
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For  20  years,  scientists  have  created  a  vast  range  of  false  autobiographical  
memories.  Variations  of  the  powerful  “Lost  in  the  mall”  paradigm  have  led  ordinary  
adults  to  appear  to  remember  nonexistent  childhood  hospital  visits,  animal  attacks,  
classroom  pranks,  and  hot-­‐‑air  balloon  rides  (for  a  summary,  see  Newman  &  Garry,  
2013).  An  analysis  of  published  “Lost  in  the  mall”  studies  suggests  that,  over  time,  the  
overall  rate  of  false  beliefs—but  not  false  memories—generated  in  these  studies  has  
increased  (see  Figure  S1  in  Supplemental  Material).  Yet,  a  recent  demonstration  was  
nonetheless  surprising:  when  Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  suggested  to  young  adults  that,  as  
adolescents,  they  had  committed  a  crime  resulting  in  a  brush  with  police,  70%  
constructed  "ʺrich  false  memories”  (p.292).  As  Shaw  told  PBS’s  NOVA  on  the  “Memory  
Hackers”  episode,  the  false  memories  "ʺjust  kept  coming  and  coming  and  coming.”  
Yet  that  70%  finding  should  give  researchers  pause,  because  it  is  markedly  
outside  the  central  tendency  of  the  “Lost  in  the  mall”  literature.  In  a  recent  mega-­‐‑
analysis  comprising  423  memory  reports,  22%  of  subjects  were  classified  as  having  
developed  [“full”  or  “robust”]  false  memories  (Scoboria  et  al.,  2017).  How,  then,  did  
Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  create  so  many  false  memories?  In  this  paper,  we  provide  
evidence  that  they  didn’t.    
In  “Lost  in  the  mall”  studies,  two  or  more  independent  judges  typically  read  
transcripts  of  subjects’  memory  reports  to  determine  if  subjects  reject  the  suggestion  
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outright,  appear  to  believe,  or  even  appear  to  remember  something  about  the  false  
event.  To  date,  13  of  16  of  these  studies  have  distinguished  between  people  who  appear  
to  develop  false  beliefs  versus  those  who  appear  to  develop  false  memories.1  Although  
different  labs  have  defined  and  classified  beliefs  and  memories  differently,  the  gist  of  
the  distinction  is  this:  People  with  false  beliefs  appear  to  accept  that  the  false  event  
occurred,  or  they  imagine  or  speculate  about  it.  People  with  false  memories  provide  
further  evidence  that  they  “genuinely”  remember  the  event.  For  instance,  they  might  
elaborate  on  the  suggested  event,  talk  about  emotions,  or  confidently  state  that  they  
“remember  the  event  occurring.”      
Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  said  they  did  not  distinguish  between  false  beliefs  and  
memories  in  their  research.  Nor  did  they  use  any  one  of  several  established  coding  
schemes  that  distinguish  between  false  beliefs  versus  memories,  because  they  feared  
these  schemes  might  not  meaningfully  differentiate  among  their  subjects’  reports.  
Instead,  they  developed  a  new  coding  scheme  that  they  described  as  “very  
conservative”  (p.  295).  At  first  glance,  this  new  coding  scheme  does  indeed  look  
conservative:  Subjects  had  to  meet  six  criteria  to  be  judged  as  reporting  a  "ʺfalse  
memory."ʺ  For  instance,  subjects  had  to  report  details  about  the  event  in  the  final  
                                                
1 Studies  distinguishing  between  false  beliefs  and  memories  include:  Desjardins  &  Scoboria,  2007;  French,  
Sutherland,  &  Garry,  2006;  Garry  &  Wade,  2005;  Hessen-­‐‑Kayfitz  &  Scoboria,  2012;  Hyman  &  Billings,  
1998;  Hyman,  Husband,  &  Billings,  1995;  Hyman  &  Pentland,  1996;  Lindsay,  Hagen,  Read,  Wade,  &  Gar-­‐‑
ry,  2004;  Ost,  Foster,  Costall,  &  Bull,  2005;  Otgaar,  Scoboria,  &  Smeets,  2013;  Porter,  Yuille,  &  Lehman,  
1995;  Wade,  Garry,  Nash,  &  Harper,  2010;  Wade,  Garry,  Read,  &  Lindsay,  2002  cf  Heaps  &  Nash,  2001;  
Loftus  &  Pickrell,  1995;  Pezdek,  Finger,  &  Hodge,  1997. 
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interview  session,  including  “critical  pieces  of  false  information,”  and  provide  a  basic  
account  of  how  the  event  occurred.  During  debriefing,  subjects  had  to  indicate  that  they  
genuinely  came  to  believe  they  had  forgotten  about  the  event,  that  it  really  did  happen,  
and  that  they  hadn’t  talked  to  their  family  members  about  the  study.    
But  consider  the  consequences  if  Shaw  and  Porter’s  70%  included  a  mix  of  
subjects  who  appeared  to  (falsely)  remember  the  crime,  as  well  as  those  who  simply  
accepted  the  suggestion  and  then  speculated  about  the  details.  After  all,  we  know  that  
false  memories  and  beliefs  are  qualitatively  different,  and  so  should  be  reported  
separately  (Bernstein,  Scoboria,  &  Arnold,  2015;  Clark,  Nash,  Fincham,  &  Mazzoni,  
2012;  Scoboria,  Boucher,  &  Mazzoni,  2014;  Smeets,  Telgen,  Ost,  Jelicic,  &  Merckelbach,  
2009).  In  one  “Lost  in  the  mall”  study,  subjects  rated  false  memories,  but  not  false  
beliefs,  as  being  phenomenologically  similar  to  real  memories  (Lindsay  et  al.,  2004).  
Thus,  there  are  good  reasons  to  distinguish  between  subjects  who  appear  to  believe  an  
event  occurred  and  those  who  appear  to  genuinely  remember  it.  By  eliminating  this  
distinction,  Shaw  and  Porter’s  “conservative”  coding  scheme  may  actually  have  been  
liberal.    
To  address  this  possibility,  we  recoded  Shaw  and  Porter’s  subjects'ʹ  memory  
reports  using  three  different  coding  schemes.  We  used  Shaw  and  Porter’s  own  scheme  
to  make  sure  we  could  reproduce  their  results.  We  used  Lindsay  et  al.’s  (2004)  scheme  
and  Scoboria  et  al.’s  (2017)  scheme  because  they  both  distinguish  between  false  beliefs  
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and  memories,  yet  each  uses  a  different  approach  to  make  the  distinction.    
Two  independent,  highly  trained  judges,  unfamiliar  with  Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  
study  and  blind  to  our  hypotheses,  reclassified  Shaw  and  Porter’s  memory  reports.  
Judges  agreed  on  80%,  discussing  and  then  resolving  79%  of  the  others  into  the  more  
conservative  category  (say,  from  the  equivalent  of  a  false  memory  into  false  belief),  and  
21%  into  the  more  liberal  category2  (say,  from  the  equivalent  of  a  false  belief  into  a  false  
memory).  Details  about  judges’  training  and  the  criteria  they  used  appear  in  the  
Supplemental  Material.  
Table  1  shows  the  criteria  for  each  coding  scheme  and  our  results.  When  we  
recoded  Shaw  and  Porter’s  data  using  their  own  scheme,  we  replicated,  exactly,  their  
70%  result.  When  we  recoded  Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  data  using  Lindsay  et  al.’s  (2004)  
scheme,  30%  of  subjects  met  the  criteria  for  false  memories  and  43%  for  false  beliefs  (in  
Lindsay  et  al.’s  parlance,  “images  but  not  memories”).  Combining  30%  with  43%  yields  
73%—close  to  Shaw  and  Porter’s  70%.  When  we  recoded  Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  data  using  
Scoboria  et  al.’s  (2017)  scheme,  26%  of  subjects  met  the  criteria  for  false  memories  (in  
Scoboria  et  al.’s  parlance,  this  figure  also  includes  a  more  fervently-­‐‑held  level  of  false  
memories).  Another  43%  met  the  criteria  for  accepting  the  event  but  said  they  didn'ʹt  
remember  it.  Combining  43%  with  26%  yields  69%—again,  close  to  Shaw  and  Porter’s  
                                                
2 As  the  note  for  Table  1  shows,  when  we  resolved  all  disputes  into  the  more  liberal  category,  the  patterns  
we  report  here  did  not  change. 
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70%.  Taken  together,  these  findings  suggest  that  many  of  Shaw  and  Porter’s  subjects  
didn'ʹt  demonstrate  signs  of  remembering,  but  simply  accepted  the  suggestion,  
speculated  about  it,  or  conjured  up  mental  images.    
At  this  point,  the  skeptical  reader  might  ask,  “So  what?”  Thus  far  we  have  merely  
established  that  two  other  coding  schemes  produced  results  similar  to  each  other—
results  that  were  more  conservative  than  Shaw  and  Porter’s.  It  does  not  necessarily  
follow  that  those  two  schemes  did  a  better  job  of  tapping  into  real-­‐‑world  notions  of  
remembering  a  false  event.  And,  as  Neisser  (1978)  sharply  reminded  us,  we  must  not  be  
so  enamored  of  the  laboratory  that  we  neglect  the  real  world.  If  laypeople’s  view  of  
remembering  accorded  with  one  of  the  more  conservative  coding  schemes,  that  would  
provide  some  evidence  of  converging  validity.  
Therefore,  we  conducted  two  experiments  in  which  we  told  over  300  Mechanical  
Turk  workers  (Experiment  1,  N  =  102;  Experiment  2,  N  =  214)  about  Shaw  and  Porter’s  
procedure.  We  asked  these  laypeople  to  read  transcripts  randomly  selected  from  those  
our  judges  had  re-­‐‑classified,  using  the  Lindsay  et  al.  (2004)  scheme,  as  reporting  the  
equivalent  of:  (a)  false  memories;  (b)  false  beliefs;  and  (c)  no  memories.  Importantly,  
Shaw  and  Porter  themselves  had  classified  each  of  these  transcripts  as  a  “false  
memory.”  We  said  nothing  to  these  laypeople  about  how  the  transcripts  had  been  
classified;  instead,  we  simply  asked:  “How  confident  are  you  that  the  participant  had  an  
experience  of  remembering  the  event  that  was  suggested  to  them?”  (0  =  Not  at  all  
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confident,  to  100  =  Extremely  confident).  We  reasoned  that  to  the  extent  Shaw  and  Porter’s  
definition  of  a  false  memory  reflects  real-­‐‑world  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  
remember,  then  laypeople’s  confidence  ratings  should  be  high  for  all  transcripts,  
regardless  of  their  Lindsay  et  al.  reclassification.    
We  summarize  the  basic  findings  here,  but  provide  full  details  in  the  
Supplemental  Material.  In  both  experiments,  laypeople’s  mean  confidence  ratings  did  
not  align  well  with  Shaw  and  Porter’s  definition  of  false  memory,  and  in  fact  converged  
with  Lindsay  et  al.’s  (2004)  definition.  Consider  the  memory  reports  that  both  Lindsay  
et  al.  and  Shaw  and  Porter  classified  as  false  memories:  Laypeople  concurred,  being  
reasonably  confident  that  the  reports  showed  evidence  of  remembering,  Experiment  1:  
M  =  65.59,  95%  CI  =  61.49,  69.69;  Experiment  2:  M  =  52.39,  95%  CI  =  48.13,  56.66.  But  
more  important,  for  reports  that  Shaw  and  Porter  classified  as  a  “false  memory”  and  
our  judges  re-­‐‑classified  as  the  equivalent  of  a  false  belief,  laypeople  did  not  concur  with  
Shaw  and  Porter;  instead,  laypeople  expressed  low  confidence  that  those  reports  
showed  evidence  of  remembering,  Experiment  1:  M  =  17.10,  95%  CI  =  13.00,  21.20;  
Experiment  2:  M  =  22.34,  95%  CI  =  18.87,  25.80.  In  Experiment  1,  for  the  sole  report  that  
Shaw  and  Porter  had  classified  as  a  “false  memory”  and  our  judges  had  re-­‐‑classified  as  
“no  memory,”  laypeople  were  even  less  confident,  M  =  6.12,  95%  CI  =  2.02,  10.22.    
Conclusion  
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Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  reported  creating  “rich  false  memories”  in  70%  of  their  
subjects.  But  when  we  recoded  these  memory  reports  using  two  other  coding  schemes,  
those  schemes  produced  results  similar  to  each  other,  yet  far  more  conservative  than  
Shaw  and  Porter’s.  These  recoded  results  now  sit  squarely  in  the  central  tendency  of  the  
literature.  Moreover,  when  laypeople  evaluated  the  reports,  their  assessment  of  
"ʺremembering"ʺ  was  better  aligned  with  a  conservative  coding  approach,  a  finding  we  
take  as  evidence  of  converging  validity.  We  suggest,  therefore,  a  better  interpretation  of  
Shaw  and  Porter'ʹs  data  is  not  that  70%  of  their  subjects  showed  evidence  of  false  
memories,  but  that  26-­‐‑30%  did.    
Of  course,  even  if  only  26-­‐‑30%  of  Shaw  and  Porter’s  (2015)  subjects  falsely  
remembered  committing  a  crime,  such  a  finding  warrants  concern  about  memories  that  
arise  during  a  suspect'ʹs  questioning.  Their  findings  show  that  suggestive  techniques  
such  as  context  reinstatement  and  imagination  exercises,  fused  with  a  heavy  dose  of  
social  demand,  can  lead  people  to  generate  personal  memories  of  stealing  or  assaulting  
another  person  (see  also  Laney  &  Takarangi,  2013  for  similar  results).    
Still,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Shaw  and  Porter  (2015)  developed  their  new  coding  
scheme  because,  as  they  reported,  more  established  ones  would  have  inflated  their  rate  
of  false  memories.  Yet  we  found  just  the  opposite.  When  researchers  forgo  an  
established  approach  to  coding  subjects’  memory  reports  in  favor  of  one  they  claim  is  
DE-­‐‑CONSTRUCTING  RICH  FALSE  MEMORIES  OF  CRIME          10	  
 
new  and  improved,  their  colleagues  should  be  able  to  see  the  data  coded  both  ways,  to  
better  determine  what  is  new—and  what,  if  anything,  is  improved.    
We  know  that  people  can  develop  wholly  false  memories—sometimes  with  tragic  
consequences.  It  is  precisely  because  this  issue  is  so  important  in  the  justice  system,  and  
in  people’s  lives,  that  as  scientists  we  must  be  meticulous  about  measuring,  interpreting  
and  communicating  our  results.  We  ourselves  have  occasionally  been  guilty  of  being  
unwittingly  imprecise  in  what  we'ʹve  said  and  how  we'ʹve  said  it.  When  we  aren’t,  it  
fuels  skepticism  of  memory  research  and  detracts  from  our  understanding  of  real-­‐‑world  
behavior  (see  Brewin  &  Andrews,  2017,  but  see  also  Nash,  Wade,  Garry,  Loftus,  &  Ost,  
2017).      
Words  1899   
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Table  1.  False  memory  coding  schemes  applied  to  Shaw  and  Porter’s  (2015)  data.  
  
System	   Categories	   Definition  (Quotations  taken  from  pub-­‐‑
lished  papers)	   Final  categorization  of  Shaw  &  Porter’s  (2015)  
data	  
   Criminal  
event	   Emotional  event	  
Shaw  &  
Porter  
(2015)	   False  memory	   1.  “the  individual  had  to  indicate  that  he  or  she   remembered   the   suggested   event  during   the   final   interview   by   reporting  
details  about  it.”  (p.295)  
2.  “the  participant’s   report  by   the   third   in-­‐‑
terview  had  to  include  the  critical  pieces  
of   false   information  presented  by  the   in-­‐‑
terviewer   (including  at   least   the   location  
and   the   name   of   the   friend   who   was  
supposedly   there   when   asked,   “Where  
exactly  did   the  event  occur?”  and  “Who  
was  present  during  the  event”).”  (p.295)  
3.  “the   individual   had   to   provide   a   basic  
account  of   the   false  event   in   response   to  
the   instruction   “tell   me   everything   you  
remember   from  start   to   finish,”   and   this  
account  had  to  include  more  details  than  
those   provided   by   the   experimenter   (at  
least  10  unique  details  in  total).”    (p.295)  
4.  “the   participant   could   not   have   recalled  
the  false  event   immediately  upon  its   ini-­‐‑
tial  presentation.”  (p.295)  
5.  “the  participant  had  to  indicate  that  he  or  
she  had  not   talked  to  his  or  her  primary  
caregivers  about  any  part  of  the  parental  
memory   questionnaire   (i.e.,   during   de-­‐‑
briefing,   answered   “no”   to   the   question  
“Did   you   talk   to   your   parents?”).”  
(p.295)  
6.  “after  being  informed  that  the  false  event  
had   not   actually   happened   (during   de-­‐‑
briefing),   the   participant   had   to   answer  
“yes”   to   the   question   “Did   you   believe  
that  you  had  forgotten  the  event  and  that  
it  actually  happened?”  (p.295)  
21  (70%)	   22  (73%)	  




“false  belief”)	   “Participants  who   provided   fewer   than   10  details   but   claimed   at   debriefing   that   they  had   believed   the   event   actually   happened  
were   classified   as   being   accepting   of   the  
false  memory  event”  (p.295)	  
3  (10%)	   3  (10%)	  
 Compliance	   “Participants  who  provided  10  or  more  de-­‐‑
tails  of   the   false  event  but  did  not  claim  at  
the   debriefing   that   they   had   believed   the  
event  actually  happened  were  classified  as  
compliant”  (p.294)	  
4  (13%)	   3  (10%)	  
 No  memory	   “Participants  who   provided   fewer   than   10  
details  and  asserted  at  debriefing  that   they  
had   not   believed   the   event   happened   to  
them  were  classified  as  having  no  memory  
of  the  false  event.”  (p.295)	  
















ries	   “Judges  were  to  classify  a  report  as  memo-­‐‑ries  only   if   the   subject   appeared   to  believe  
that   he   or   she   was   remembering   the   sug-­‐‑
gested  event.”  (p.151)	  
9  (30%)	   6  (20%)	  




“applied   to   cases   in  which   the   subject   de-­‐‑
scribed  images  associated  with  the  suggest-­‐‑
ed   event   but   did   not   appear   to   experience  
those   images  as  memories  of   the  event  per  
se.”  (p.151)	  
13  (43%)	   16  (53%)	  
 No  images  or  
memories	   All  other  cases.  	   8  (27%)	   8  (27%)	  
Scoboria  et  
al.  (2017)	   Substantial  false  memory	   “high  level  of  acceptance  of   the  suggestion  and   moderate   imagery   and   elaboration”  
(p.17)	   7  (23%)	   6  (20%)	  
Complete  false  
memory	   “moderate  acceptance  with  moderate   elab-­‐‑oration  and  moderate  imagery”  (p.17)	   1  (3%)	   1  (3%)	  
 Partial  false  
memory  	   “moderate   acceptance   with   any   level   of  elaboration  and  any  imagery”  (p.17)	   0  (0%)	   4  (13%)	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 Accept  (similar  
to  “false  be-­‐‑
lief”)	   “accepted   the   suggestion   as   true   to   some  degree   but   did   not   meet   the   criterion   for  remembering”  (p.18)	   13  (43%)	   6  (20%)	  
 Rejected	   “Regardless   of   whether   the   event   met   the  
criteria   for  partial,   full,   or   robust  memory,  
if   the   participant   stated   at   the   end   of   the  
interview  that  s/he  did  not  have  a  memory  
of   the  event,  we  coded  the  event  as   ‘reject-­‐‑
ed.’"ʺ  (p.17)	  
3  (10%)	   6  (20%)	  
 No  memory	   “cases   for  which  acceptance  of   the   sugges-­‐‑
tion  was  coded  as  zero”  (p.16)	   6  (20%)	   7  (23%)	  
  
  
Note:  For  the  Shaw  and  Porter  coding  system,  we  were  unable  to  apply  criteria  5  and  6  to  the  dataset  our-­‐‑
selves  because  Shaw  and  Porter  did  not  record  the  debriefing  and  the  data  were  unavailable.  Thus,  we  
assumed  that  all  of  the  subjects  met  criterion  5  and  did  not  discuss  the  critical  events  with  their  caregiv-­‐‑
ers.  For  criterion  6,  Shaw  and  Porter  provided  us  with  a  spreadsheet  that  contained  subjects’  responses  to  
the  qualifying  question,  “Did  you  believe  that  you  had  forgotten  the  event  and  that  it  actually  hap-­‐‑
pened?”  We  used  these  data  to  apply  the  criterion.  Note  that  in  addition  to  the  false  crime,  half  of  Porter  
and  Shaw’s  subjects  were  led  to  believe  they  experienced  a  fictitious  emotional  event  during  adolescence.  
We  re-­‐‑coded  the  data  from  this  condition  as  well  and  present  the  findings  in  the  far-­‐‑right  column.  
Our  judges  agreed  on  80%  of  cases,  and  after  discussion,  categorized  79%  of  the  other  cases  in  the  more  
conservative  (i.e.,  not  a  false  memory)  category.  When  we  resolved  disputes  into  the  more  liberal  (i.e.,  
false  memory)  category,  the  patterns  we  report  did  not  change.  Using  Scoboria’s  coding  scheme,  33%  
were  classified  as  false  memories  and  40%  as  accepting  (a  combined  total  of  73%),  and  using  Lindsay’s  
coding  scheme,  43%  were  classified  as  false  memories  and  30%  as  images  but  not  memories  (a  combined  
total  of  73%).  Therefore,  judges’  resolution  towards  the  lower  category  does  not  account  for  the  discrep-­‐‑
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